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§1. A Prove for the Existence of a Perfect Being | Does anyone believe that science may offer us a final description of reality? Some naturalists do tenaciously hold that science, at least in principle, has the potential to do so.  
However, Immanuel Kant has argued that the human brain, by its own internal construction, is kept away from the ‘real’ world by an impenetrable screen of representations. We cannot know how the world in itself, the ‘noumenon’, really is. Reality can be divided in a world known to us, and, on the other hand, a world that, no matter what, cannot be known perceived to us (the world in itself). Kant believed that our thinking, when we try to understand the ‘noumenon’, will reach deadlock. 
What, according to Kant, can we say about the noumenon: is it a stretch of space and time with properties so alien to us that its real nature cannot be conceived at all? Or is it something ‘unknowable’ that we nevertheless need to postulate in order to escape idealism and solipsism? Or is it something that is ‘unknowable’ in an absolute sense and that therefore may as well be regarded to be non-existent?
(…) things are given to us as objects of our senses situated outside us, but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing; we only know their appearances, i.e. the representations that they effect in us when they affect our senses. Consequently I do indeed admit that there are bodies outside us, i.e. things which, although wholly unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we know through representations which their influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of bodies. This word therefore merely means the appearance of that for us unknown but none the less real object. Can this be called idealism? It is the very opposite of it. (Kant, I., Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, (trans: Lucas, P.G.), Manchester U.P: Manchester, 1953). 
However, one may doubt if Kant actually has succeeded in proving that there is a noumenal world. Alfred Ayer, for one, held that Kant’s view is untenable: 
[Kant] said that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. And thus he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic (...) a matter of fact. He asserted, not that our minds could not conceivably have had the power of penetrating beyond the phenomenal world, but merely that they were in fact devoid of it. And this leads the critic to ask how, if it is possible to know only what lies within the bounds of sense-experience, the author can be justified in asserting that real things do exist beyond, and how he can tell what are the boundaries beyond which the human understanding may not venture, unless he succeeds in passing them himself (Ayer, A., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin, 1975, p.46-47)
Modern neurology has however shown that the world is, at least partly, indeed a construction of the human brain.​[2]​ One may therefore hold that Kant’s division between world and world in itself still makes sense. The idea that reality is divided in two worlds, a world formed in accordance with the innate structure of our brain and a world that escapes our understanding, has unintentionally been revived by the work of Charles Darwin. Evolution seems to underwrite a Kant-like division: like all animals, we do successfully inhabit a niche of our own. Our niche is, however, confined by the rational laws that govern our cognition. Therefore it is aptly called the ‘cognitive niche’.​[3]​ Therefore the world seems to be divided in a cognitive niche and a world that transcends our cognitive niche.
Now (some) naturalists believe that science aims to describe, at least in principle, the whole of reality:
We can only pretend to make any [scientific] progress at all if we assume that the laws of physics, as we can discover them here on earth, apply to the universe as a whole (Leggett, A.J., The Problems of Physics, Oxford, 1988, p.79).
 In other words, our cognitive niche, that part of reality that we can understand and study, must converge with reality itself. No part of reality should be excluded. According to this view we have the cognitive resources to fully comprehend the physical structure of reality (assuming that physics is the science that studies the ultimate structure of reality).
However, it is possible to frame a forceful evolutionary argument against this view. In the words of Christopher Cherniak:
Natural selection appears to design –over design- for maximum efficiency in the given environment... It is not at all clear that there could be a cognitive system attuned to all aspects of the apparently unlimited diversity and complexity of the universe (Cherniak, C., Minimal Rationality, in: Mind (1981) Vol. XC, 161-183).
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we can, in principle, demonstrate to fully understand reality. Then we cannot but conceive of our rational brain as a perfect organ: for what more can we ask of our cognition than to understand everything there is (i.e. to understand the ultimate physical order that underlies reality)? However, we having a perfect brain would be a most amazing feat: for evolution seems to tell us that it is very improbable that a certain trait is perfect. Moreover, assuming a trait that amounts to perfection may be considered to be an outright fallacy.​[4]​ Perfect traits simply cannot evolve solely by chance. However, it contradicts the alleged causal autonomy of the natural world if we assume that we are the outcome of an intentional process. Therefore, if indeed our brain proves to be a perfection, we may as well believe that evolution is an intentional process.  –Put in more explicit religious terms: only with the help of God who intentionally created us can we explain having a perfect brain. This is Plantinga’s well known argument against naturalism.​[5]​
Since the naturalist cannot accept the existence of God (accepting the existence of a super-natural being would be self refuting) nor that evolution is an intentional proces, he has to chose the other horn of the dilemma and assent to the idea that we will never be able to understand and study the whole of reality. In other words: the naturalist must accept Kant’s proposal that reality is subdivided in two worlds: a world structured and perceived by us (this is our ‘cognitive niche’) and a world that is beyond our understanding. The world outside our cognitive niche, that is: the world beyond our understanding, can, by definition, not be studied thoroughly (otherwise it would have been a natural part of our cognitive niche).
The existence of a transcendent reality doesn’t seem to harm the worldview of the naturalist. It is something he can live by. Why should the naturalist mind about a reality that, since it cannot be known, may as well be considered to be non-existent? The natural world is the only world that matters to us. Even if deism, the view that God or gods do reside in the noumenal reality, is true, the naturalist should not care about their existence: a super-natural world that cannot be known is, in fact, non-existent. And since our natural study of the world seems to reveal that the physical world is causally closed, there is no need to abandon naturalism.  
However, please note that things have slightly changed: by introducing the concept of a cognitive niche, it has been possible to make a shift from ‘a world that can not be known’ to ‘a world that cannot be understood’. Ayer’s criticism, aforementioned, does not apply to ‘a world that we cannot understand’. Ayer is of course right in claiming that we cannot say much about a world that we cannot know, but we can, to a certain extent, determine and investigate what we can and cannot understand: this is something we can experience. I can experience that I do not understand Chinese. Therefore we may, reluctantly, assume that the world outside our cognitive niche can to a certain extent be experienced.
The laws of logic -and especially the law of non-contradiction- are without doubt the distinctive characteristics of human rationality.​[6]​ We may hope to understand reality as long as the laws of logic are not violated in any way. As soon as these laws fail us, for whatever reason, our understanding of reality will fully collapse. Therefore, if we think it reasonable to accept the division between our cognitive niche and the outer, noumenal world, we must also think it reasonable to accept the idea that all true statements about reality cannot be coherently and logically ordered in one overall system - which is a bold thesis.​[7]​ In other words: the laws of logic cannot be applied universally nor are they necessary. Now, if the laws of logic do only hold within our cognitive niche, we have no other option but to suppose that the description of the world outside our niche must contain conflicts and contradictions: this may  eventually explain why we are incapable of expressing all facts about reality within one single coherent, logical structure. Moreover, we may even believe that reality itself is not coherent: we know that an eye does not function in a room where there is no light and that an ear does not function in a room where there is no sound- likewise we may believe that our brain does not function outside our cognitive niche because of a ‘total lack of logical order’).
If the noumenal world does indeed exist, we cannot escape the surprising conclusion that trivialism, the model that states that contradictions really exist, is the best model to represent the structure of the world outside our cognitive niche. Moreover, trivialism says that every statement whatsoever is true. Trivialism pictures a world that cannot be understood by our cognition at all.​[8]​ 
(...) If it is possible for trivialism to be true it may be false as well as true that all humans are mammals, that New York is a city, that you are currently reading this chapter, and so on. And not just both true and false: they may at the same time be neither true nor false, only true or false, and so on, even if all the evidence bearing on these claims may all be simultaneously true. (Kroon, Frederick, Realism and Dialetheism, in: Priest etc., p.252).
A strange reality indeed, but please keep in mind that trivialism does not hold within our cognitive niche. This queer, illogical world will only appear to be true when we try to understand the world outside our cognitive niche. (This, again, conforms to Kant’s idea, that our understanding will lose itself in contradictions when it attempts to deal with the noumenal world).
Now, it is possible to formulate a very simple prove for the existence of God: if in the world outside our cognitive niche, by definition, everything whatsoever is true, (when trivialism holds outside our cognitive niche) it is also true that there exists a Perfect Being.
Perhaps it is convenient to summarize the argument:
i.	Either we do or we don’t understand reality;
ii.	If we understand reality, we need an exceptional explanation for this fact;
iii.	However, we must reject such explanations: they count against science (evolution);
iv.	Therefore, we have to assume that we do not (fully) understand reality; 
v.	We are incapable of understanding reality, when our rationality fails;
vi.	Our rationality fails, ultimately, when the laws of logic do not hold; 
vii.	When the laws of logic do not hold, we may as well believe that everything is true;
viii.	If everything is true, it is also true that a perfect being exists.

§2. Arguments and Reasons | William James observed that there is an important difference between a live and dead hypothesis.​[9]​ Now, in order to make the prove for the existence of a perfect being ‘one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed’, I will provide reasons, arguments and explanations that may persuade the reader to accept the view outlined above.
In paragraph 3 (§3) I will explain why I think that the prove may be of interest to the reader. The merit of the argument is that it founds the truism, accepted by most religions, that there is more to reality (the transcendent, the super-natural) than can be studied by natural science. 
The first thing that stands in need of explanation is the claim that the laws of logic hold only within our cognitive niche. In §2 I will argue for the truth of this claim. The overall argument consists of four minor steps: First I will argue that the laws of logic do not in any way belong to our physical world. In other words: the laws of logic do not exert any force on the properties of the physical world in order to keep reality logically structured. In this sense one cannot be a realist with regard to the laws of logic (§2.1). Secondly, I will consider arguments by Graham Priest and Hilary Putnam, saying that there is no rational prove at all to be given for the absolute truth of the LNC (§2.2). Thirdly, I will provide a natural, evolutionary explanation for the laws of logic. The overall idea is that these laws have been contrived by evolution and that therefore they are innate (like Kantian ‘forms’). These laws are needed to structure our knowledge so as to be able to adequately use it in action (§2.3). Fourth, I will argue against the view that the success of science proves that the world is logically and coherently structured (§2.4).  
§2.1 The Laws of Logic are not Real – If the laws of logic hold for all of reality, this can only be the case if there is a real force that logically structures matter. The laws of logic, therefore, have to be the most basic laws that are still capable of causally framing reality. It doesn’t make sense to claim that the material world has a certain order, if there is no force in nature at all that frames the laws of nature. Moreover, if the laws of nature are forced to bring about a logical order, the laws of logic must be viewed as laws that causally connect to the laws of nature. However, these logical laws, underlying reality, have never been discovered. We have never measured real logical forces or real logical particles. The existence of such a basic logical framework is an assumption. 
However, if the logical structure of reality is based upon an assumption, then we may not infer that this logical structure really exists. Therefore, the assumption that the whole of reality has an underlying logical structure, still stands in need of empirical verification (it certainly cannot be accepted at face value). It is obviously circular to accept the existence of the laws of logic by assuming them.
There is also another problem regarding this proposal. Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that there actually are logical forces that causally connect to our world. What then can we say about the universal applicability of these logical forces? Probably: nothing at all. Forces and particles are contingent until proven otherwise. So, even if we detect a ‘logical’ particle or a ‘logical’ force, this does not discharge us from the plight to empirically investigate the whole of reality in order to determine its alleged logical structure. And never can we prove, at least not in our empirical world (and, unfortunately, not during our lifetime), that these logical laws will hold always and forever. Therefore, the idea that reality is logically structured must be considered a skyhook within the framework of a natural worldview.​[10]​
Since the laws of logic are obviously no natural forces themselves (and since they cannot be explained away either), we should perhaps take seriously the suggestion that the laws of logic emerge from the laws of nature.​[11]​ However, this will not suffice to explain why the laws of logic are supposed to structure the whole material world. If the laws of logic are emergent properties, they cannot be basic: this implies that the laws of nature, at some basic level, do not necessarily display any logical order at all. In other words: if the laws of logic supervene upon the laws of nature, then we may believe that the natural world has no underlying logical frame and, hence, that there is no reason why we should believe that the laws of logic determine the structure of reality. 
We may, therefore, conclude that the material world, although it seems to display a logical structure, in fact hasn’t got such a structure at all. 
§2.2 We Cannot Rationally Establish the Truth of the Law of Non-Contradiction – If the laws of logic are no natural (empirical) laws, then perhaps they are rational laws, that is: laws that can be grasped by our minds. The ontological status of the laws of logic does perhaps resemble that of mathematical laws. The truth of such rational laws needs to be established by rational prove. Unfortunately, the use of rational prove implies the use of the LNC, the Law of Non-Contradiction. - A forceful argument against the universal truth of the LNC along these lines has been given by Hilary Putnam. The name of his argument is the ‘centrality argument’: 
[The laws of logic] are presupposed by so much of the activity of the argument itself that it is no wonder that we cannot envisage their being overthrown by rational argument. But we should be clear about what the centrality argument does not show. It does not show that a putative law of logic, for instance the principle of contradiction, could not be overthrown by direct observation. Presumably I would give up the principle of contradiction if I ever had a sense datum which was both red and not red, for example. And the centrality argument sheds no light on how we know that this could never happen (Putnam, Hilary, There is at Least one A-Priori Truth, in: Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers Vol.3, Cambridge, 1983).
The truth of the LNC has also been doubted by Graham Priest.​[12]​ Not only does he stress that we lack any formal argument for the truth of  LNC, but, moreover, he believes outright that it is possible to show that the LNC can be violated. He states that it is rational to accept that some contradictions are true (this view is called dialetheism). Priest observes that ‘there has not been a sustained defense of LNC ever since Aristotle’.​[13]​ Interesting is his remark that: 
It is sometimes said that dialetheism is a position based on sand. In fact, I think, it is quite the opposite: it is the LNC that is based on sand. It appears to have no rational basis; and the historical adherence to it is simply dogma. Hence it fails (Priest, Graham, What is so Bad about Contradictions?, in: Priest etc.).
Priest delivers some examples of what, as he claims, are true contradictions. For example, take someone who exactly places his foot on the threshold when leaving a room. Is he still in the room or is he out?: 
The pure light of reason therefore countenances only two answers to the question: I am both in and not in, or neither in nor not in. (...) If I am neither in nor not in, then I am not (in) and not (not in). By the law of double negation, I am both in and not in (Priest, 1998).
Another example of what may be a genuine and true paradox is the paradox of the liar. Overall we may conclude that, even if the LNC is a rational law, we cannot prove that the LNC is true always and everywhere. Even if we may someday solve the problem of how the laws of logic and the structure in our world are tied together, we still have no reason at all to believe that contradictions and conflicts cannot obtain. There is no convincing evidence for the claim that LNC is universally true. -This will do to refute the claim that LNC describes the essential order that we find in our world.
Willard Van Quine has most famously argued against the universal truth of the laws of logic.​[14]​ According to Quine the laws of logic are our most common truths. However, this doesn’t imply that these laws are true always and everywhere. In Quine’s own words:
 Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision (Quine, W.V., Two Dogma’s of Empiricism, in: From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, 2ed., p.43).
According to Quine the laws of logic are not ‘immune to revision’. The difference between the laws of logic and our other meanings and beliefs is one of ‘degree, and not in kind’. His main argument is that ‘meaning’ is distributed over the whole web of belief; therefore, if you amend the web in some place, this may thereby affect all other beliefs that constitute the web. From this observation it follows that also the meaning of the laws of logic can be amended. 
It seems that there is no prove, nor empirically nor rationally, for the truth of the LNC.
§ 2.3 A Natural Explanation for the LNC – The laws of logic are seemingly no forces nor particles, nor are they rational laws that are true always and everywhere. Nevertheless, to us the LNC seems to be more important and less contingent than all other truths. To us the LNC has a certain quality, a special look and feel, that compels us to believe that the LNC is true. In our view of the world, as Putnam remarks, the LNC plays a central role:
The idea is that the laws of logic are so central to our thinking that they define what a rational argument is (Putnam, Hilary, There is at Least one A Priori Truth, in: Realism and Reason, Cambridge, 1993, p.107). 
In this section I will explain why we believe that the LNC is an universal truth. Perhaps we have come to believe that the LNC is always true because it has over time, during the process of evolution, as Putnam notices, become the central principle of our cognition. And since it is the central principle of our cognition, we cannot doubt its truth. The LNC is the central mechanism of the only machine that we have at our disposal to produce true meanings and beliefs.​[15]​ It doesn’t make sense to talk about ‘truth’ if we do not know how to produce reliable beliefs. (Likewise, it doesn’t make sense to observe the world without our eyes.) This may explain why we cannot accept contradictory statements: they seem to fully block our cognitive machinery. This is Kant’s view, with a Darwinian twist: the LNC is a ‘form’. And it is this ‘form’ that is the central part of the cognitive machinery that determines the structure of our world. The argument is:
i. There is no explanation for the truth of LNC (assumption); 
ii. Hence we have no reason to believe that the LNC is true (based upon i); 
iii. However, rationality consists in using the rules of logic (assumption); 
iv. Therefore we cannot believe contradictory statements (based upon iii), 
v. and, moreover, we cannot argue without using the LNC (based upon iii);
vi. The LNC is an important central principle of our cognition (based upon iii, v);
vii. Since the LNC is not true, its importance cannot rationally be explained (based upon i and ii); 
viii. Therefore: we need a natural account for the centrality of LNC (based upon i, ii, vii)

The hypothesis that the LNC has, for practical reasons, become an important rational principle, may also explain why we lack any evidence for the absolute truth of the LNC. Since the LNC has simply been ‘appointed’ to its task by natural selection, there is nothing to be argued for. The law has over time proved to be very useful. Natural selection never uses tags to explain why she chose this feature over that feature. 
The overall idea is that the LNC is central to our cognition because detecting contradictions is necessary for rational thinking. Contradictions may be detrimental to the working of our brain. Fortunately, our brain  is equipped with a proper working ‘conflict detection mechanism’.​[16]​
Perhaps the American pragmatists were the first philosophers to acknowledge that our cognition is a machine that needs to produce adequate behaviour rather than true beliefs. Now, since our behaviour is displayed in the real world, some of our beliefs may contain true information about the world. Such highly informational beliefs can be conducive to behaviour. However, producing true beliefs, is not the initial function of our cognition. Charles Sander Peirce was convinced that beliefs are ‘habits of action’:
Pragmatists complement [their] biological approach with Charles Sander Peirce’s definition of a belief as a ‘habit of action’. On this definition, to ascribe a belief to someone is simply to say that he or she will tend to behave as I behave when I am willing to affirm the truth of a certain sentence. (...)
On this view, when we utter the sentence ‘I am hungry’ we are not making external what was previously internal, but are simply helping those around to us to predict our future actions. Such sentences are not used to report events going on within the Cartesian Theatre which is a person’s consciousness. They are simply tools for coordinating our behaviour with those of others (Rorty, Richard, Relativism: Finding and Making, in: Philosophy and Social Hope, Penguin,  1999, p.xxiv).
Moreover, William James, influenced by Peirce, proclaimed that thinking is only good for behaviour’s sake.​[17]​                                                                                   
In his essay ‘Two Dogma’s of Empiricism’ Quine introduces a holistic view of knowledge.​[18]​ In a later book, co-authored with J.S.Ullian, he uses the image of a ‘web’ (a web of belief) to picture his holism.​[19]​ Let us accept this image of a web as a more or less heuristic model that may help us to understand how our knowledge, e.g. the set of all our meanings and beliefs, is structured. Half-way to the end of the essay Quine states that:
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion (...) is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body (Quine, W.V., Two Dogma’s of Empiricism, in: From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, 2ed).
In other words, it is not the single belief that is the carrier of meaning, but it is the whole web that carries meaning- or, if not the whole web, then at least it are the ‘interconnected sets of beliefs’ or the ‘patterns of beliefs’ or the ‘theories’ or the ‘chunks thereof’ that carry meaning.​[20]​ We may therefore amend Peirce’s idea: not the single belief is the habit of action, but a ‘pattern’ of interconnected beliefs is the ‘habit of action’. We do not need single beliefs to guide our actions, but we need patterns of beliefs, e.g. theories, (small) sets of beliefs, to guide our actions. 
Now, these patterns of beliefs contain knowledge about the world, about other people, about ourselves, etc. The importance of such knowledge for the production of adequate behaviour may be obvious:
Generally, cognitive behaviour is more flexible than genetically pre-programmed behaviour. The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behaviour. If the environment is constant, then animals do not need to change their behaviour. Animals have to change their behaviour only if the environment changes. Cognitive flexibility becomes valuable when variability affects the species in the long run. For example, seasonal changes in the environment may necessitate a change in foraging behaviour. Difficulty in obtaining food requires deployment of flexible foraging strategies, sometimes even some sort of creativity and innovation (Watanabe, Shigeru & Huber, Ludwig, Animal Logics: Decision In the Absence of Human Language, Animal Cognition 9 (2006), 235-245).
In other words, we need our knowledge in order to become better and more flexible actors. That our forebears were forced to leave their original environment and inhabit other environments may have been possible due to their capability to act upon their knowledge.​[21]​ 
In order to make the best use of our knowledge, our web of belief must have a certain structure: if our brain should lack the capability of organizing our beliefs, our knowledge would probably be of no use at all. According to Quine, the function of the laws of logic is to structure and organize all the other beliefs. And this explains why the laws of logic are placed central in the web. Now, if you do believe that ‘the sun goes around the earth’ & ‘the earth goes around the sun’, your sense of logic might urge you to amend these beliefs.  This, in the end, results in a web of belief that is more or less coherent. 
It is clear that if whole patterns of beliefs do form our ‘habit of behaviour’, in other words, if patterns (and not single beliefs) guide our behaviour, the overall structure of our web of belief needs to be  organized in such a way that practicable behaviour can easily be deduced from it. Our patterns of belief should have a coherent structure in order to avoid intentions that conflict with each other. If the overall structure of our knowledge is coherent and logically, it will, by using the logical laws, be easy and reliable to retrieve information and avoid intentions that are not practicable. This increases our ability to act well-informed in the real world.
Perhaps we may compare structuring our knowledge with checking one’s arms in advance of the battle: once engaged in action there is no time for the archer to check his bow and arrows. Rational thinking is something we do in order to prepare our knowledge for practical use. The bird has to maintain his feathers, the cat has to maintain his fur, and we have to maintain our knowledge by thinking, deducing, inducing, associating, worrying and puzzling in order to make our beliefs cohere. 
A single belief can never contain a contradiction, but a pattern of beliefs (a scrap of the web) can. Should our web of belief include mutual incompatible beliefs, like, for example, ‘never throw stones at a philosopher of religion’ and ‘always throw stones at a philosopher of religion’, then one may, in the heat of the action, when confronted with such conflicting intentions, absolutely not know how to act. This is why our web of belief should be kept coherent. It is necessary for us to have a conflict detection mechanism, or, in other words, that we have the ability to detect and resolve contradictions.​[22]​ The LNC is the formal way of describing what the conflict detection mechanism does, by stating that our brain may never ever accept conflicting statements.​[23]​ This insight, that the brain needs to keep the mind coherent, has been voiced by William James, whose epistemological theory sees coherence as of more importance than truth. In the words of Richard Rorty:
Our responsibility to Truth is not, for James, a responsibility to get things right. Rather, it is a responsibility to ourselves to make our beliefs cohere with one another, and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with theirs (Rorty, Richard, Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance, in: Rorty, R., Philosophy and Social Hope, Penguin, 1999, p.149).
To sum up: it is necessary to detect conflicting ideas in order to make our web of belief coherent. The coherence of our web of belief is conducive to behavior.
However, why can’t we, for example, accept some contradictions (for example: why can’t we believe that the Bible is literally true and believe that evolutionary theory is literally true)? The answer is that we are capable of displaying only one mode of behavior at a time. And since we haven’t got time to sort out conflicts once we are engaged in action, we are forced to choose, in advance, between conflicting propositions and theories. It is impossible to be in two different places at one time or to act simultaneously in different ways (although it would certainly be a wonderful demonstration of inventiveness, guaranteed to confuse every robber, if you should turn left and right in order to escape a threat). Our knowledge, the web of belief, must have a coherent arrangement in order to serve the needs and demands of our physical body (maintaining our body is indeed the most important function of the brain).​[24]​ Entertaining a structure of thought that cannot be mapped onto possible behavior, like assenting to conflicting statements, should be avoided at all cost.  
Another function of our knowledge is to serve as intermediate between our senses and motor coordination. Our cognition must provide the knowledge that our senses need in order to understand the environment and make our body parts move in accordance with our impressions. The different parts and functions of the brain and body need to act together as a unity. Moreover, our cognitive system may use the coherence that exists between knowledge, senses and motor movement as a measure for the reliability of a belief: if, for example, sound and vision do not cohere, this may compel us to believe that we are deluded.​[25]​ 
I believe that we should think of logic as a set of tools required to prepare our meanings and beliefs in such a way that we may become better informed actors. Detecting and resolving conflicts is needed to avoid contradictory beliefs. Contradictory beliefs may fully block the practicability of our behavior. So, the function of logical reasoning is to maintain the coherence of our web of belief. In fact, the LNC serves as a tool that tells us which beliefs do and which beliefs do not fit in with the rest of our beliefs:
 (...) deductive arguments are valid as a function of their logical form. The content of the argument is irrelevant for the determination of validity. Despite this logical truism, one of the most robust, and problematic, finding in the psychology of reasoning is that content has a significant effect on the reasoning process (Goel, Vinod, Fractioning the System of Deductive Reasoning, in: Kraft, E., Guylas, B., & Poppel, E. (eds.), Neural Correlates of Thinking, Springer Press, 2007).
and:
(...) a robust consequence of the content effect is that subjects perform better on reasoning tasks when the logical conclusion is consistent with their beliefs about the world than when it is inconsistent with their beliefs. In the former case, subjects beliefs facilitate the task while in the latter case they inhibit it (Goel, Vinod, idem.).
Rational thinking is, in fact, knowledge maintenance. This may also explain why we should conceive of reasoning as a ‘dynamically configured fractionated system’, rather than as a single ‘module’. Goel’s neuro-anatomic description of ‘knowledge maintenance’ closely resembles a neo-Quinean description of belief revision:​[26]​
[We need] to make sense of the environment by completing patterns by filling in the gaps in the available information. (...) [The brain] abhors uncertainty and will complete any pattern, often prematurely, to the detriment of the organism. The roles of the conflict detection and uncertainty maintenance systems are respectively, to detect conflicts in patterns and actively maintain representations of indeterminate/ambiguous situations and bring them to the attention of the interpreter (Goel, Vinod, Fractionating the System of Deductive Reasoning, in: Kraft, E., Guylas, B. & Poppel, E. (eds.) Neural Correlates of Thinking, Springer Press, 2007). 
The laws of logic are indispensable tools that keep our web of belief in a coherent shape and, most importantly, that prevent the occurrence of conflicting intentions to pop up in our minds when knowledge-guided action is needed.  It is the overall shape of our web of belief that matters most to the brain and not the reasoning process as such. 
A coherent web of belief is necessary in order to act fast and well informed. -We may ascribe the following imperative to evolution: never ever maintain a way of thinking that may impair your ability to act. And this imperative, no doubt, explains why the LNC is so important to us. We need the law to swiftly mediate between knowledge, thought and action. A coherent web of belief is necessary for displaying quick and frugal behavior and to avoid behavioral deadlock. The need for coherence may also explain why it is not possible to give a rational or empirical prove for the LNC. The only classical prove there is for the LNC seems to be a lack of any counterexample whatsoever, which, quite ironically, does exactly state what the LNC is meant to do: produce coherent patterns of beliefs by inhibiting beliefs that are in conflict with the rest of our beliefs. If producing life-saving behavior is natures’ most important goal, then, why should she allow the human brain to form contradictory patterns of belief that may derange our potential to act adequately?
§2.4. The logical Order and the Success of Science – Why do scientific realists nevertheless believe that the world is logically ordered? Because they believe that the alleged logical order may sufficiently explain the success of science.​[27]​ According to this view the success of science proves that reality indeed has a logical order. Moreover, proving the truth of a scientific theory is also regarded as prove for the metaphysical idea that reality literally has a logical structure. The idea is that at a basic level the stuff that constitutes our world is itself logically arranged. 
I believe that this thesis cannot be sustained: in §2.1 I have remarked that it is hard to see how this thesis does fit in with a scientific worldview. There are no logical forces or particles that causally connect to the laws of nature. Then what are we to make of the idea that the logical order we find in this world is real? Since (i) we cannot argue for the truth of these laws and (ii) since we are able to provide (some sort of) evolutionary explanation for these laws, we may believe that the naturalist’s account is not true.  
There are more arguments that count against this argument from the success of science. An important objection against this view is the observation that our theories do not converge into a single overall coherent theory of reality. However, only a ‘theory of everything’ (or, a coherent assembly of theories) should count as convincing evidence for the existence of a logical order. As things stand now, our theories do obviously not cohere with each other, and we may therefore even regard their ‘success’ (there are two very successful physical theories: they do however not fully cohere with each other) as an argument that counts against the idea that the world is coherently ordered! 
However, for the sake of argument: let us suppose that reality indeed has a uniform and coherent structure. Now, if reality has a uniform structure, we may expect that at a basic level all theories will nicely cohere with each other; and we may also believe that these coherent theories, when considered as a unity, cannot but reveal the underlying logical order of reality. However, if there is such an order, why then have we never been able to construct a scientific method that generates all kinds of new true discoveries? From the time of the logical-positivists on, we have not been able to describe a scientific method.​[28]​ However, if there is a logical structure, as real as can be, how can there not be a scientific method? If it is even possible to frame a mathematical system for something as complex as ‘chaos’, why then is a ‘logical and coherent’ reality reluctant to systematization? Moreover, psychologists have not been able to describe what scientific rationality is.​[29]​ Such negative results make one wonder: why haven’t we been able to describe the rationality that underlies scientific progress if (i) the world itself is coherent, regular and lawlike and (ii) our brain is smart enough to understand this coherent, regular and lawlike nature of reality? What more does a scientist need in order to study reality and prove its coherency? What mysterious thing is this logical structure that supposedly can be grasped by the rational mind yet cannot be proved to exist?
If reality is indeed uniform, coherent and logically structured, then why is it that the newest theories of physics are so much harder to conceptualize than are our folk-theories (or, Newtonian mechanics)? This seems counterintuitive (to me, at least). For if reality has a uniform logical structure and if ever more pieces of the scientific puzzle are put in place, one should expect to get an ever better and more complete view of this overall coherent structure-  this must be so by definition. Moreover, one may also suppose to acquire an ever increasing understanding of reality, since the laws of logic are the key to understanding. In other words: if science indeed reveals to us ever larger parts of reality, and if indeed reality has a uniform structure, then we may expect that the earlier theories, appealing less to our rational faculties because they reveal less of the logical order, should be harder to conceptualize and understand. However, it seems to be the other way round. Especially quantum mechanics differs significantly from our common sense worldview. –Therefore I believe that the overall picture shows that there is no underlying logical order that keeps reality together. The reason why the newest theories are perhaps harder to understand may be due to the fact that our rationality, acquired by evolution, is not suited to handle the plethora of facts that we have unearthed. The only way to put things logically together is, perhaps, by introducing artificial subdivisions in our overall web of belief like between ‘real and true’ theories and ‘false’ theories (according to such a view only the findings of science may be real and, unfortunately, your view of daily life is an illusion), leaving us with a highly abstract and somewhat artificial worldview.     
We may conclude that our most successful theories are very useful but also that they, despite their usefulness, do not necessarily contribute to the idea that the world, as a whole, is logically ordered. 
However, there is another point to be made in favour of the ‘success’ argument: 
The sciences provide an increasingly integrated and unified understanding of reality, resulting in precise predictions which correspond to empirical results. Success may also be understood practically, since scientific understanding allows us to manipulate parts of reality with enormous precision. Electrons are not merely hypothetical entities, but have become instruments of further research (Drees, W., Religious Naturalism and Science, in: Clayton, Philip & Simpson, Zachary, The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, Oxford, 2006, Ch.7.).
The point of Willem Drees is that our measurements are very precise- and it is this precision that proves that our scientific theories are literally true and that the world must therefore exhibit a certain order. However, the meaning of the word ‘precise’ is itself not very precise. How precise must science be in order to be successful? Well, as a matter of fact, we do not know. There is no other planet where a rival group of scientists is also conducting scientific research, so we cannot compare our scientific progress with theirs. Perhaps we are inclined to think that science is successful because science has changed our lives significantly. From this psychological truism however we may not deduce that science shows that reality itself has a logical structure. 
If reality is not uniform and coherent, then how can we explain why our predictions are so precise? Once again, we do not know that our predictions are very precise. Perhaps our scientists are the laughing stock of the universe. Besides, it doesn’t matter much how precise our predictions are. The only thing that matters is the truth of our theories- and, unfortunately, we know of no physical theory that is absolutely true. Therefore, the ever increasing precision of the measurements and the excellence of the predictions do seemingly not directly contribute to the truth of a theory. In other words: there is no necessary connection between the precision of our theories and the truth of our theories. Therefore, the precision of our physical theories do not contribute to the view that the world has a coherent and logical order which is revealed by science. 
Science is, of course, not restricted to physics. Evolutionary theory is also part of science. Now, it may be interesting to repeat Alvin Plantinga’s argument (§1, §2.3): is it probable that, given our evolutionary background, ‘science is successful’?​[30]​ The answer is ‘no’. If evolutionary theory is true, it is not at all clear that we have any good reason to believe that we will ever successfully investigate the whole of reality (including the very small and the very large). Evolution itself may explain why this is so. By investigating the very large and the very small we move away from the world that we evolved in. We may therefore expect that our theories become ever more complex. Moreover, it may be ever harder to press all the information into one coherent and logical system. In order to save our rational system, we have to fractionate our knowledge in different worlds that can hardly coexist except by proclaiming that only one of these systems is true: the scientific worldview is true, our religious idea’s are false and our folk-theories are primitive (and, of course, false). 
It is hard to be a naturalist and believe that reality is coherent and uniform. In other words: it is hard to believe that evolution is true and to believe that science is indeed successful because reality itself has a logical and coherent structure. The view that should be adopted by the naturalist –a view that is most faithful to evolutionary theory- is that we are the inhabitants of a cognitive niche in a very vast reality. And this view explains why our rationality is unfit to describe the world outside our niche. We are not fit to understand the truth, but we need to cope within a part of reality (§1).​[31]​
The idea that our brain is tailor made to understand reality is deeply seated within our minds. However, we must be careful to avoid the evolutionary fallacy aforementioned: our brain certainly did not develop because it intended to study reality. We have no reason whatsoever to believe that we have any extraordinary cognitive power compared to that which we need in order to endure within our niche. The idea that there is an underlying logical order that keeps reality within the reach of human understanding is most certainly based upon wishful thinking. However, we are so entrenched in our coherent worldview that we cannot but sternly believe that it is true. 
This does not demean science. Science is a most impressive enterprise. But why should we regard science as an activity that differs qualitatively from our natural ability to cope with the natural world? We possess all kind of folk theories that help us to cope with reality, like folk-physics, folk biology, folk psychology, etc. These theories incorporate knowledge about the world we live in (it says that we cannot pass through stonewalls, that big cats are fierce and dangerous, that toadstools are poisonous and that kinship does not withhold people from telling lies, etc.).​[32]​ 
Modern science is without doubt an improvement over folk science. However, the same goes for almost every aspect of our lives. We do not think that in the stone age there were much concert halls where one could hear the like of Mathias Goerne sing lieder. Nevertheless, our forebears may have had a certain gift for singing, perhaps by coarsely groaning and humming. Now, may we perhaps believe that our music making has so much improved -the singer is able to precisely master timing, pitch and sound- that ‘singing lieder’ is a perfection as such (singing has become a perfection, because we cannot imagine anyone sing finer and better than Goerne)? 
I think that it is so much fairer to believe that science, as practiced by our primitive forebears, stands to modern science as primitive singing stands to modern singing. The brain we use to solve scientific problems with is the same brain that we use to frame our folk-theories. Moreover, psychologists and philosophers have, as I have said before, not been able to single out a certain kind of scientific rationality that may explain the ‘success of science’. The rationality that suffices to run a bakery does, in principle, suffice to run a modern research group. Therefore it is perhaps best to say that science is not an enterprise that reveals the truth, but a way of coping with our environment and improving the quality of our lives: science works. ​[33]​
Why is the naturalist so opposed to the idea that reality is not structured by a logical framework? Because, as William Ockham notices, a world without the laws would transform,
 “the entire foundation of ... [God’s] ordained law” into “the most fleeting of contingencies ever liable to be dispensed with,” “throwing all certainty, morality, and indeed probability into the melting pot,” (Ockham, William, cited in: Oakley, F.)​[34]​.
Such a ‘most fleeting of contingencies’ is more than most naturalists can bear. The very idea of a reality that is not limited by any order whatsoever nullifies the initial goal of science. It implies that we will never be able to give a full and complete description of reality. In fact, it means that reality itself fully overrides our sense of order.
§2.5 Summary of the Argument – The laws of logic are pivotal to our rationality. However, they do not describe the structure of the real world, but they mirror the structure of our innate rationality. Using these laws is thinking and producing truth’s. If lesions may impair our ability to detect conflicting information or if the world does not match the order displayed by our brain, we will not be able ever to give a full description of reality. Moreover, the failure to apply these laws will by definition result in the most irrational of all possible worlds.
 
§3. The Super-natural | The logical order resides not in the world but in ourselves. The brain is so constructed that it works all information up into coherent order. Our surplus of knowledge can only be used to fuel our behaviour if coherently ordered (muscles and feathers can also only be of good use when they are structured). We need to construct a cognitive niche in order to survive in several different environments. In this section I will try to explain what a cognitive niche is and why the world outside our cognitive niche is, by definition, so utterly strange, that we may indeed dub it a ‘super-natural’ reality. 

§3.1.  A niche is a reality in a reality – The idea that our world is, to a certain extent, a creation of our own, may give rise to the unpleasant idea that our view of the world is a mere fantasy. But it isn’t. Andy Clark and Peter Mandik defend the view that our niche is part of a more substantial reality and should therefore be viewed as real.​[35]​ No one wishes to say that fish inhabit fantasy-worlds. Being adapted to a ‘cognitive niche’ is no more the expression of a fantasy then the adaptation to an ‘aquatic’ or ‘airy’ niche is. The overall idea is that we are part of a more substantial reality that cannot fully be comprehended by our rationality. Therefore we can only display our behaviour within the realm of our cognitive niche. 

Our environmental niche became a cognitive niche when our forebears were, at some point in history, forced to leave the woodlands. For a long time the early hominids tried to survive in two wholly different environments, woodlands and savannahs.​[36]​ Intruding a new environment makes an organism lose its initial adaptational advantages. If you live in trees, you need long arms (to grab the branches), but on the savannah-grounds you do prefer to have muscular legs and a tail as counterbalance (to run with). However, if you live in both environments, you may need some intelligence to deal with morphological shortcomings: 

Early hominids would have been very vulnerable to predators on grasslands and sparse woodlands. They would have been more exposed, with fewer (perhaps far fewer) save retreats. Surely cooperation was the only solution. Baboons are large savannah primates, and their anti-predator cooperation might offer a model of the possibilities and costs of anti-predator defense. However, unless rock-throwing and clubs were exploited for defense, early hominids may have relied more on collectively organized vigilance than on collective defense and deterrence (Sterelny, Kim, Thought in a Hostile World, 2003, p.130). 
Co-operation may have been the driving force behind encephalisation. However, in explaining what initiated the growth of the human brain, it is (yet) not possible to tell what the exact order of causes has been. Did the brain grow because hominids had to leave their environment and were forced to co-operate? Or did the brain grow by coincidence, providing enough intelligence to invade new environments? Did the use and development of tools contribute to this process? One thing however is for sure: intelligence is most welcome. 
Living in various environments means that innate routine must be overruled by deliberate decision. Animals that are fully adapted to their natural environment may keep using the same strategies. They may, for example, fully rely on their speed. But in different environments you have to give up such routine in favour of action fuelled by intelligence. Therefore mere intelligence stuffed in a big brain will not do. It is wise to structure your knowledge so as to have it ready for use. 
Our cognitive niche may be regarded as the logical, abstract overview of the different environments that we are acquainted with. Possibly the characteristics that are common to most or all of these environments are incorporated into our cognitive niche. In this regard our cognitive niche may be seen as an abstract model of what all the earthly environments have in common. Nonetheless, our cognitive niche, although it may be an abstraction, is definitely ‘real’: it guides real action, it underlies real behaviour and it is a real subset of a vaster reality. 
Our world, as Mandik and Clarke argue, is as real and wonderful as any world. There is no reason to believe that our view of the world, just because it is a model of a reality within a richer reality, is altogether false. Evolution may have confined our view, but we are nevertheless the inhabitants of a real world: our theories of science are not complete but nevertheless they are real. However, our overall understanding of reality may be limited.
§3.2. A Transcendent or Super-natural Reality  - One of the most important features of human rationality is the capability to resolve contradictory information. Our brain has at its disposal a ‘conflict-detection’ mechanism (§2.4). If this mechanism may ever fail, for whatever reason, we will not be able to construct a coherent worldview. Now, since making sense of the world consists in ordering and processing information by our rational brain, the failure to do so, will,  by definition, result in a view that is quite the opposite of a rational worldview. The collapse of the very fabric that constructs rationality results in a highly irrational worldview. Therefore, if our brain cannot construct such an overall logical and coherent view of reality, it follows that reality itself must have a structure that is not logical and not coherent. 
The fact that reality itself has no coherent and logical order may explain why it takes the brain much effort to create an overall coherent worldview (§2.1, §2.2). It is not possible to keep a huge database free from conflicts.​[37]​ Therefore it may be necessary to subdivide our knowledge. One may, for example, accommodate our folk-knowledge with our scientific knowledge by distinguishing between a ‘real’ scientific world and an ‘illusionary’ world of daily experience.​[38]​ According to this view tables and chairs are not ‘real’, while particles and forces do ‘really’ exist.​[39]​ The conviction that we have to break up reality in different worlds in order to save the logical framework that underlies our cognitive niche, has been propagated by quite a few philosophers.​[40]​ Another example of such a division is the one between our cognitive niche and the rest of reality. However, the divide between our cognitive niche and the rest of reality is not sharp. Our cognitive niche is dynamical, its borders are not fixed. The only frame that remains ever unchanged is the one formed by the laws of logic.  
The laws of logic apply to our knowledge of the world. The set of statements about reality itself, when not restructured by us, probably abounds with conflicts. We have to accept the existence of a more substantive reality that cannot be modelled to fit our logical framework. When our ‘cognitive engine’ definitely fails to handle the illogical characteristics of reality, our rational system will fully collapse. Hence, since the whole of reality cannot be fully captured by our cognition, it is, by definition, a transcendent reality. 
We cannot transcend our cognitive niche and investigate reality as it is in itself. The fabric of our cognition, aptly captured by the laws of logic, determines the boundaries of our cognitive niche. Since the laws of logic do, by definition, not make much sense when applied outside our niche and since these laws define what rationality is, we cannot escape the conclusion that the transcendent reality is illogical. It is a reality that basically resists being ordered according to the laws of logic. There is but one model to picture this illogical transcendent world: it is called trivialism, the view that anything whatsoever is true. -Indeed, trivialism is the model that fully withdraws from our capacity to produce a coherent overall worldview. 
Since we will never be able to study the transcendent with the help of natural science, we may as well believe that the transcendent is the super-natural. It is the realm that supersedes our natural world. On the other hand, the natural world, the worldview we derive by doing science, lies within our cognitive niche (please note that the ‘super-natural’ has no connotation with the occult). 
Perhaps naturalists and super-naturalists alike may feel reluctant to accept this terminology. Trivialism  is ‘just’ a model that attempts to formalize the illogical. As such it has nothing to do with religion or God. However, this objection is mere word play. A realm that transcends our cognitive niche has everything a world needs in order to be classified as a super-natural world. Trivialism represents a world too queer to understand. Every concept imaginable does literally exist in this super-natural world. It is filled with gods, unicorns, golden-mountains and square-circles and, moreover, with a real perfect being. Why not believe that this indeed is the super-natural realm? Perhaps the reluctance to accept this proposal is because we are not used to the idea that the super-natural is a realm that can to some extent be conceded by our cognition and, moreover, of which the features can be described by the use of a model.
 §3.3. Religious Pluralism and the Nature of the Super-natural - The overall view defended here is simple: our cognitive niche is constrained by the laws of logic, reality itself however isn’t. Therefore we are forced to accept the view that our cognitive niche is a subset of a far greater reality. And, since this wider reality transcends our understanding, we may as well name it the super-natural world (as opposed to our natural world). 
This division between a cognitive niche and the transcendent world bears on the ongoing debate between believers and non-believers. The stance defended by atheistic scientists (naturalists) is that belief in the super-natural is unjustified. Whoever wants to believe that there is more to reality than can be studied by science probably does so because he deliberately fails to appreciate the merits of science. According to Drees,
We ought to accept a naturalist view, since it is the position that is most respectful of the epistemic success of  the natural sciences, and thus cognitively preferable. It is also more preferable, as it incites us to work with our knowledge (Drees, Willem, Religious Naturalism and Science, in: Clayton, Philip (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, Oxford, 2006).
Since the existence of the super-natural contradicts the findings of natural science, and since science is by far the most reliable method for acquiring knowledge that we have at our disposal, one should, according to the naturalist, not even consider to take seriously the belief that actually there is a super-natural realm. However, if reality is not confined and structured by the laws of logic, we have no reason at all to believe that reality has an initial structure that somehow corresponds to the structure of human thought. If one wants to be ‘respectful of the epistemic success of the natural sciences’, one should dispose of the idea that reality is structured in a way that complies with the structure of human rationality. 
We may therefore believe that the view, ventured by most religions, that there actually is a reality that transcends our natural world, is true. Most famously John Hick and Keith Ward, both philosophers of religion, have defended the view that the existence of such a super-natural realm is taken for granted by the world-religions, and, moreover, that the super-natural is needed to explain away the differences that exist between the various religions.​[41]​ This view is called the pluralist hypothesis: 
The hypothesis is that there is an ultimate reality, which I refer to as the Real- though sometimes, because there is no ideal term, also speaking of Ultimate Reality, the Ultimate, the Transcendent- which is itself transcategorial (ineffable), beyond the range of our human conceptual systems, but whose universal presence is humanly experienced in the various forms made possible by our conceptual linguistic systems and spiritual practices (Hick, John, An Interpretation of Religion, Yale, 2005, p.xix).
According to Hick the transcendent reality is ultimately unknowable, but it can nevertheless be interpreted in many different ways.​[42]​ Some believers may experience the transcendent as personal (a personae) other believers as impersonal (an impersonae). Religions are viewed as systems whose initial goal it is to come to grips with the Real. Since the Real transcends the human understanding, no one can give a true account of its essence. However, according to the pluralist thesis, this doesn’t mean that we may therefore dismiss the world religions altogether as being ‘false’: after all, the referent of their belief, the Transcendent, truly exists. No matter how much the world religions may differ from each other, they all agree that belief in the transcendent lies at the core of their worldview. 
The pluralist thesis is very appealing since it explains how all religions are based on the same model: a reality divided in a natural and a super-natural realm. This simple division lays bare the deep architecture common to all religions.   
However, there are some problems with the pluralist view. According to Hick, the Real, the Unknowable, cannot be known at all. Therefore it is vain to presuppose its existence. Hick’s ‘pluralism’ seems vulnerable to the same criticism as the one launched by Ayer against Kant’s division (between the world and a world in itself (§1)): if the transcendent cannot be known, how can you know that you experience it? And if it cannot be experienced, why assume its existence at all?
Moreover, Keith Ward believes that Hick’s thesis is not satisfying to all believers:
One problem with Hick’s view is that the pluralistic hypothesis would not be accepted by all the great post-axial faiths. Some forms of Buddhism would deny that there is one ultimate divine Reality. There is only , they might say, the perpetual flow. Other faiths would deny that the Real transcends their vision of it. Some Christians, for example, would say that God really is essentially a Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit. There might be more to God than we know, but what we know captures the essential nature of God, and does so accurately (Ward, Keith, The Case for Religion, Oxford, 2004, p.226). 
Perhaps it is possible to formulate a version of religious pluralism that does not diverge too much from Hick’s initial ideas. To do so, we have to return to the prove for the existence of God (§1). Trivialism is the model that obtains when our laws of logic fail. It is a model that states that everything is true. And if everything is literally true, then it is also literally true that a Perfect Being exists. This is a genuine prove for the existence of God. However, if everything is true, then so is the statement ‘God does not exist, only the existence of Brahma is literally true’. And so is the statement ‘Only the perpetual Flow exists’. Now, what are we to think of this? Well, not much. It just proves that we cannot quite understand what the real nature of the transcendent or super-natural is. But what we do know is that there is nothing wrong with accepting all different statements as equally true. The transcendent is a realm that neatly displays those exceptional features needed to make pluralism true. It may be a matter of further dispute of what the spiritual meaning of this view is. The point that matters is that we, once forced to accept the existence of the super-natural, are also forced to accept the truth of pluralism. –The pluralism we obtain states that all religious concepts are literally true and, moreover, that one may even believe that his own beliefs are exclusively and literally true (whilst knowing that all other believers are equally justified in adhering to such an exclusivist view)! 
It is without doubt very hard to understand this realist version of pluralism: for how can all religions simultaneously be true while they obviously differ from each other? Well, there is an explanation. What I have argued for (§2) is that logical thinking is all pervasive because we have to act quite adequately in our physical world. Such adequate acting requires that we make the right choices and accept reliable beliefs: therefore, one may rightly say that we are ‘choice generating machines’ by nature. Since we, by invading new environments, are forced to rely on our knowledge, we have to structure our knowledge in such a way that making choices is a swift and reliable process. The ultimate consequence however is that our cognitive machinery does not match the order that we may find elsewhere in reality. And this implies that there must at least be parts of reality in which we, because there all options are equally real, cannot choose or act.​[43]​ Since our cognitive machinery conflates rational thinking with choosing and thinking, we cannot understand the nature of this ‘transcendent reality’.
The things that exist in this transcendent reality have ‘transcendent existence’. According to trivialism, all our concepts have ‘transcendent existence’. Now, we probably do not value a teapot because it has transcendent existence: we need our teapots here, on earth, to actually put some tea in it. A flying teapot may be a very charming concept and it also has transcendent existence, although, I do not believe that its transcendent existence does add much to the usefulness of the concept. What good is a transcendent flying teapot? On the other hand, the concept of God having real ‘transcendent existence’ makes it a very useful concept indeed, for it makes true our religious beliefs. If  the naturalist wants to know if our believe in God is true, we may explain to her that indeed it is true. However, God is a transcendent being, which means that we may positively confirm His existence but, unfortunately, we also lack the cognitive machinery to actually understand Him. Therefore we can refer to God (as if his name functions like a rigid designator) and assent to His existence, without defining in detail what the concept of God amounts to. All we need to know is that He is worthy of our praise, that His existence is real and perhaps that His skills and abilities by definition transcend ours. –It is up to us to try and understand what a transcendent God amounts to. 
The prove is also vulnerable to parody: if everything is true, so is the transcendent existence of ‘That Than Which no Worse can be Conceived’.​[44]​ Although true, I do not believe that the concept, enriched with transcendent reality, is very useful to us. We are to judge which concept, when given transcendent existence, is still useful and which is not. It is our fate that we lack the ability to understand the richness of the super-natural, and, being physically confined to our world in which we need to choose, have to reduce its transcendent beauty to our attenuated reality. The fact that God transcends our understanding may perhaps add to his greatness, while residing in the super-natural realm does not make ‘the worst possible being’ any worser: transcending our understanding is by definition a positive quality. Moreover, transcending our understanding may not make much other concepts more useful.  
Now, since all religions may likewise assume the real transcendent existence of their holy concepts, religious pluralism must be true. But this doesn’t mean that we have to submit ourselves to all religions at once: we, physical beings, have no choice but to adopt one religion and live by its ritual and doctrine. It is also possible to just accept the concept of the transcendent and believe that it proves that there is so much more to reality than we can know and understand, and, moreover, find comfort in the idea that we are the inhabitants of a world that is filled with mystery and that cannot be reduced to the proportion of human understanding. The transcendent may even exert some effect  on our world. After all, our (natural) world and the super-natural world are not fully separated from each other. Our cognitive niche is a part of the super-natural world. We may therefore not beforehand dismiss as nonsense the idea that we may, in the long run, learn something more about the strange characteristics of the transcendent. And this, the fact that the natural world is not fully separated from the super-natural world, may also explain the strange content of mystical experiences.
§4. Conclusion | The view outlined in this article involves an extensive defence of religion:    
a) The claim made by almost all religions that there is a supernatural realm may be literally true.
(b) Our cognitive niche is part of a transcendent reality. We can however only conduct natural science within our cognitive niche, for conducting science presupposes the proper functioning of our cognitive machinery. Natural science can therefore never systematically prove that God, or other super-natural beings and objects, does not exist and, moreover, the naturalist cannot accuse the believer of irrational epistemic behaviour for accepting as literally true the existence of God. 
(c) Since our cognitive niche is part of a transcendent reality, we may assume that there is not necessarily a ‘conflict’ between religion and science: scientists have to accept reality the way it is. We may even believe that the super-natural influences our world. 
(d) This view may explain why adherents of all religions do report having mystical experiences: since there is a real transcendent world we may indeed believe that experiencing the super-natural is a genuine possibility. These experiences should therefore be taken seriously and not, in advance, be viewed as the result of improper brain functioning.
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